Fall, 2026
November 20 (Friday), 2026, 11:30AM-12:30PM (PST) / 1:30-2:30PM (CST) / 2:30-3:30PM (EST)
“Assimilation as a Courtesy: Manchu Bureaucrats and Imperial Personnel Strategy in Qing China (1726-1820)”
Cheng Cheng (New York University)
Abstract: How do minority rulers govern majorities? A dilemma arises when small dominant groups must govern through majority-facing institutions while preserving the ethnic boundaries that sustain minority rule. I argue that rulers manage this tradeoff by cultivating partially assimilated co-ethnic elites: officials who acquire majority cultural fluency while remaining embedded in minority institutions. I evaluate this claim using an original panel of roughly 34,000 position-years and 5,200 Qing officials between 1726 and 1820, using the adoption of Chinese courtesy names by Manchu bannermen as a proxy for cultural fluency. Manchu with courtesy names received more important local post in Manchu-specific association that vanishes among Han officials once credentials are controlled. At position transitions, courtesy-name officials accumulate significantly more merit grades conditional on their prior record, suggesting that the personnel system systematically rewarded this dimension. Over the career, these officials rotated more frequently between majority-facing civil posts and boundary-reinforcing banner posts, and were more likely to be recalled from provincial postings back to central court service, consistent with an incentive structure that encouraged partial assimilation while limiting over-assimilation. These findings suggest that assimilation can function not only as a strategy of subordinate groups, as has been shown in the literature, but also as a technology of rule for dominant minorities. My project develops partial assimilation as a framework for understanding how minority regimes preserve ethnic closure while staffing majority-facing institutions.
Discussants: Peng Peng (Washington University at St. Louis) and Vasiliki Fouka (Stanford)
December 4 (Friday), 2026, 11:30AM-12:30PM (PST) / 1:30-2:30PM (CST) / 2:30-3:30PM (EST)
“Digital Panopticon, Built on Cheap Surveillance”
Alison Sile Chen-Zhao (University of California, San Diego)
Abstract: Autocrats have long relied on imprisonment and surveillance to suppress disaffected citizens. However, pervasive incarceration disrupts production and weakens the state, while traditional surveillance is labor-intensive and generates more records than bureaucrats can process. Digital surveillance, powered by AI and large-scale infrastructure, offers an alternative: it allows citizens to stay productive while enabling the regime to preempt opposition. Through formalizing state-citizen interactions under surveillance, this paper shows how digital surveillance reshapes authoritarian social control. The technology affects citizens unevenly. People who pose moderate threats to the regime are most likely to be surveilled. As the technology grows cheaper, surveillance expands to lower-threat citizens; as it grows more accurate, it expands to higher-threat ones. A further finding runs against common intuition: cheap, instead of advanced, surveillance is the key to authoritarian durability, because its constant use deepens self-censorship across the population. An ongoing data collection effort, drawing on large language models to organize hard-to-process Chinese sources, provides empirical traction on the theoretical arguments.