Spring, 2026

March 27 (Friday), 2026, 10-11AM (PST) / 12-1PM (CST) / 1-2PM (EST)

“Administrative Reform under Fire: Evidence from China’s Civil Service“

Mike Thompson-Brusstar (Trinity College)

Abstract: When are developing countries able to reform the state, and when do such reforms fail? This paper uses the dissolution of the reform coalition in China to theorize the role of elite consensus in administrative reforms. I argue that expert consensus shaped not only the adoption and shape of the original civil service provisions, but also its subsequent adoption after the model was discredited. The paper takes advantage of an original collection of personnel management publications from the ascendance of the civil service model in the mid-1980s academia through the eventual passage of the draft provision for a Chinese civil service in 1993. These data document how both insiders and outsiders altered their proposals and support for personnel reform after the reform coalition’s dissolution, with implications for the civil service’s design and implementation. The results shed light on the role of political elites and coalitions in institutional change, the politics of state capacity construction, and the role of epistemic competition on the content and support of administrative reforms.

Discussants: TBD

April 10 (Friday), 2026, 10-11AM (PST) / 12-1PM (CST) / 1-2PM (EST)

“Technology, Trade, and Power: The Sectoral Logic of China’s Outward FDI“

James Frick (U.S. Army War College) and Roselyn Hsueh (Temple University)

Abstract: Chinese outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) increased exponentially following the 2008 Global Financial Crisis. What explains the global financial risk taking at the commercial level by firms from an authoritarian state? This paper contends the Chinese government utilizes OFDI as a foreign policy tool to achieve political economic ends. The Chinese government leverages OFDI based on the perceived strategic value at the sector level of the investment destination to enhance the national technology base, promote the global competitiveness of indigenous industry, and achieve geopolitical ambitions. Exploiting a novel measure of technology intensity of trade, original cross-national panel models with country and time fixed effects examine Chinese OFDI in developing countries from 2010-2022. Results, accounting for resource and defense trade indexes, show Chinese OFDI is a function of technology intensity of exports (market access), technology intensity of imports (technology transfer), and United Nations roll-call votes (political affinity). Results by world region and illustrative cases further substantiate the paper’s arguments.

Discussants: TBD